Monday, January 27, 2014


203 Appendix D THE CHANGING POLITICAL-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT: SOUTH ASIA Ashley J. Tellis The surety environment in south Asia has remained relatively un-settled since the Indian and Pakistani atomic tests of May 1998. The Indian goernments groundss to in ordinary emphasize the challenges chinaware posed in the weeks leading up to those testsafter more(prenominal) than a decade of mostly sotto voce complaintsserved to bust the or-dinarily glacial process of normalizing Sino-Indian relations. This process unceasingly possessed a certain fragility in that the gradually de-creasing tensions along the Sino-Indian camber did non automatically translate into increased trust amongst capital of Red chinaware and progress Delhi. Even as both sides desire to derive tactical advantages from the confi-dence- building measures they had negotiated since 1993for ex-ample, the drawdown of forces along the utterly unfriendly LAC in the Himalayas from each one ended up pursuing larger luxe strategies that effectively undercut the others interests. Beijing, for example, per-sisted in covertly assisting the thermo thermo atomic and rocket programs of Indias local competitor, Pakistan, bandage new-sprung(prenominal) Delhi desire in re-sponse to pay back an intermediate-range ballistic missile whose comparative receipts lay primarily in targeting China. The tell identification of China as a threat to Indian interests by both Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders and other important Indian elites in the first half of 1998 not single underscored the fragile temper of the Sino-Indian rapprochement but likewise ruptured the guardedly maintained façade of improving relations between the twain coun-204 The United States and Asia tries.1 When this general finger loading ultimately gave way to Indias resumption of thermo atomic exam on May 11, 1998 (an character ac-companied by the Indian prime ministers univocal claim that those tests were dr ive by the hostile actions of Indias Union ! neighbor over the years), security competition in atomic number 16 Asiawhich usually appears, at least in popular perceptions, as merely a bilateral affair between India and Pakistan hithertotually revealed itself as the voiceal strategical triangle2 it has always been. This appendix analyzes Indian and Pakistani attitudes toward China in the linguistic context of the triangular security competition in South Asia. fetching the 1998 nuclear tests as its point of departure, it assesses how China figures in the grand strategies of the ii principal narrates in the Indian subcontinent and identifies the principal regional geopolitical contingencies for which the United States should pre-pare over the next decade. Finally, it briefly analyzes the kinds of opportunities the region offers to the airforce as it engages, even as it prepares to hedge against, a move China. NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE TRIANGULAR SECURITY contender IN SOUTH ASIA Impact of the Nuclear Tests on Sino-Indian dealing Although Pakistan was instantly affected by the Indian nuclear tests, these tests busy Chinese security interests as well. To begin with, Indias finale to suck up testing made manifest New Delhis re-sentment toward Beijing for its almost two-decade-long assistance to capital of Pakistans nuclear and missile programs. Indias official claim that its resumption of nuclear testing was precipitated at least in part by sundry(a) Chinese actions (such as the transfer of nuclear weapon designs, short ballistic missiles, and assorted technologies in-tended to enable Islamabad to produce strategic systems indige-nously) was meant to signal the fact that India was capable of ______________ 1 These azoic 1998 events bequest been summarized in Manoj Joshi, George in the China Shop, India Today, May 18, 1998, pp. 1016. 2 For a candid discussion, see Brahma Chellaney, The regional strategic Triangle, in Brahma Chellaney (ed.), Securing Indias Future in the New Millennium, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999, pp. 313336.The Changing ! Political-Military Environment: South Asia 205 support its own security interestsif necessary through slanted solutionsand that rise in almost aspects of Sino-Indian bilateral relations could not be sustained if it came at the expense of undercutting the core intent of preserving Indias safety, integrity, and primacy in South Asia.3 Further, the stopping point to test and the financial mastery that India would de-velop a nuclear deterrent implied that New Delhi would at rough point seek to target China with nuclear weapons. This ride at re-placing abject vulnerability with mutual vulnerabilityno matter how asymmetrical it might besuggested that Indian policymakers were offhanded to hang their hopes solely on the peacefulness of Chinese intentions, in particular over the long term, given that Beijings big businessman is expected to grow even kick upstairs and the relative derivative in its strategic capabilities vis-à-vis New Delhi is in all likelihood to become ev en more manifest. Indias decision to maturate a nuclear deterrent thus suggests that India seeks at a minimum to possess the kinds of deter-rent capabilities that result immunize it against possible Chinese nu-clear coerce in the event of a crisis.4 Finally, Indias decision to resume nuclear testing has also been complemented by an case to modernize the Indian militaryan ef-fort that has encompassed upgrading Indias conventional forces, including those elements tasked with argue the mountainous run into areas facing both Pakistan and China. This modernization, which slowed down during the nineties for financial reasons, is likely to gather momentum during the coming decade as Indian security managers increasingly recognize that, regardless of what happens in the land of diplomatic relations, maintaining robust conven-tional capabilities remains not only the vanquish insurance against deter-rence breakdown but also a resilient precondition for making good on Indias public pledge never to use nuclear weapons first.5 _________! _____ 3 This matter is emphasized in J. Mohan Malik, India Goes Nuclear: Rationale, Benefits, cost and Implications, Contemporary southeasterly Asia, Vol. 20, nary(prenominal) 2, August 1998, pp. 191215. 4 The faultfinding importance of deterring blackmail in Indian calculations is high gearlighted in Jasjit Singh, wherefore Nuclear Weapons? in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear India, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998, pp. 925. 5 For more on this calculus, see Tellis (2001). 206 The United States and Asia The Sino-Indian eternal sleep Indias novel decision to conduct nuclear tests, to develop a nuclear deterrent, and to accelerate the oft-postponed modernization of its conventional forces has lots engendered the conclusion that New Delhi now views Beijing as a clear and make up danger to its secu-rity. In point of fact, this is not the case. To be sure, the Indian capi-tal would appear to be severely populated by individuals, work out tanks, and associations who vociferously s ustain the imminence of the Chi-nese threat. These claims are usually base either on Western reve-lations about Beijings assistance to Islamabads nuclear and missile programs and its turbid activities in Burma or, alternatively, on dis-tant fears such as the prospect of a rapidly growing China returning to complete its docket of topic reunification at a time when it will have dramatically surpassed India in most of the relevant cate-gories of national authority.6 These challenges, however magic spell ac-knowledged both by elected Indian officials and by the higher(prenominal) bureaucracy in New Delhihave not produced the kinds of reactions Indian commentators have often expected because, repose simply, In-dias state managers have a more than better grasp of the Sino-Indian power balance than many analysts give them cite for. For more than a decade, Indian policymakers have in public pur-sued a subtile policy toward Beijing. Although the forceful statements of several Ind ian leaders in the months surrounding the nuclear tes! ts were exceptions to this rule, more modern Indian initiatives vis-à-vis Chinaincluding the June 1999 visit of Indian Foreign diplomatic minister Jas evil Singh to Beijingsuggest that Indias China policy has belatedly swung back from the extreme of polemical criticism to a untold more centrist effort at realistically managing the complexness and tensions inherent in the Sino-Indian relationship.7 The logic of this effort can high hat be appreciated in the context of un-derstanding the perceptions of major(postnominal) Indian security managers with ______________ 6 These concerns are summarized in Amitabh Mattoo, complacence round Chinese Threat Called Frightening, India Abroad, April 5, 1996. 7 A good comment of the complexity of Sino-Indian relations can be lay down in Surjit Mansingh, Sino-Indian Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 285300. 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