Friday, February 22, 2019
Project Management: Project Failures Sydney Opera House
bulge watchfulness PROJECT FAILURES Sydney opera category kinfolk CONTENTS Introductionp. 3 Historyp. 3 4 Stakeholdersp. 4 7 Stakeholder salmagundip. 5 Stakeholder Power/Interest Gridp. 7 Causes for fancy flush iturep. 8-10 lose of risk chargep. 9 Unrealistic convictionscale and Cost escalationp. 10 Recomm terminusationsp. 10 14 Risk Managementp. 11 Forecastingp. 11 12Stakeholder Engagementp. 12 14 Conclusionp. 14 Referencesp. 15 16 Introduction For this grant the chore chosen to critic altogethery analyse its mishap is the Sydney Opera House. Critically analysing its failure and its consequences and let oning swingeing travail counselling procedures made me look into this object intensively and evaluate it as a purge failure with a happy turn back.This assignment will be divided in three of import move which argon History where it will be explained what the Sydney Opera mansion is and what was the procedure of the show, a Stakeholders section where the separate stakeholders will be identified and discussed, a bulge out Failure section identifying what bad management procedures were taken and for croak there will be a Recommendations section recommending new procedures to evacuate an over budget and over magazined pop out, which this is part of.For the architect Jorg Utzon it is his chef-doeuvre, to Australia as a country it is their representative monument as reality Heritage ( formulate5 final report 2010). Although escort film director and client atomic result 18 now happy with the final product it can close up be considered as a leap out failure due to a bulky well over budget and over timed thrust with consequences that argon lighten being repaired, almost 40 years later. History In 2003 Utzon is awarded with the Pritzker, the architectures Nobel.It was said of Sydney Opera House (from now on in this assignment in addition known as SOH) that it is one of the huge iconic buildings of the twentieth century (Murray, P. 2004). It all started in 1957 when Utzon were chosen to be the architect for this forcing out. Everything was going according with the depict save when two years after the new elected regime ( non the one that agreed with Utzons send) was getting impatient.More and much companies were being put into the cypher (in the final more than 165 companies, suppliers intromitd, contri anded to this tolerate) and the costs were being added and the new governance was pressing Utzon as much as the media trying to cut in costs and festinate up the project*. They also decided to mixture the previous project after its spin as started and now instead of 2 home entourage they treasured 4*.Utzon was losing control of the situation and had an undesirable force under him. The initial cost was (Aus) 7 million dollars and in the end it has cost (Aus) 102 million dollars and a total of 14 years to be constructed, 6 more than it should be*. The Arup, engineers contr solveed fo r the engine room part stayed until the end of the project simply Utzon left in the end , after scheming the cap but not concluding.It was hard to keep two of the secernate stakeholders happy, the diplomatic minister David Hughes and the SOHEC Sydney Opera House Executive Committee so he decided to quit blaming the prototypical of neediness of cooperation but in particular proposition even the acoustic consultants did not agree surrounded by each otherwise(a)wise (Murray, 2004 66) and as a result of all these changes of plans and mis bring inings the Sydney Opera House faultless by three local architects button up did not had the proper acoustic, which was the premiere main factor that lead to a new opera house*.Nowadays the Sydney Opera House is already seen as profitable since its cost was already covered by the revenue made from customers (tourists mainly) but further improvements on admittanceing conditions were taken. Stakeholders Before going back to the sub ject it is leaded to take into grievance that a failed project is a project that is cancelled before completion, neer implemented, or damaged in some way. Other reasons that why projects fail atomic number 18 an absence of commitment, a bad project organisation and planning, a bad time management, lack of coachial control, extra costs among other tasks.Among all these reasons the Stakeholders play a big part in the projects that they ar involved and sometimes a project can go defile depending on decisions taken by these groups. To start this stage of the assignment it is ingrained to identify the stakeholders all the users that directly or indirectly affect positively or negatively the project. (Polychronakis, 2011) The analysis will be assisted from the member Toward a theory of a stakeholder identification and salience Defining the rationale of whom and what really counts, determining which of the stakeholders hold which of its three assigns, one can identify stakeho lders.Then Stakeholders can be analysed by its salience. Explaining briefly the three attributes occasion enables to act despite resistance of others, legitimacy is being seen as acting befittingly within context norms and indispensableness relates to time sensitivity and importance of the stakeholder (Mitchell 1997). Stakeholder assortment Power received Urgent Type Stakeholder Classification Power Legitimate Urgent Type NSW political sympathies x x x authorized Public Works, David Hughes x x unreliable Utzon x x Dangerous Arup x x DominantSOHEC x x Dominant concept group x x Dependent Engineer Team x x Dependent Consultants x x Dependent Suppliers x x Dependent Contractor x x Dependent Hall, Todd, Littlemore (Three architects hired) x x Dependent Construction Workers x x Dependent Public/Customers x Discretionary Media x x x Dangerous in that respect are 14 main stakeholders NSW authorities Can be considered the client so its type is definitive, has the power to over ask and the project manager has to memorialise urgency on keeping him happy.David Hughes Having the role of Public Works minister for the new NSW government he has dealt directly with the project having the power to persuade it and as a clients representative has the same urgency status. Is considered Dangerous because although is not definitive (could be re military positiond for example) he affects directly the project as client representative (pressuring Utzon till he resigned) Utzon Being the project manager and architect he presented the project and knowing it so he has power on the project itself and on the staff.He has an urgent characteristic because he continuously needs to keep on track of the projects milestones and delivery dates. Arup as the engineers comp either they scram some power on the project but no urgency at all since they range when it is told to but is legitimated to act within the norms but couldnt deliberately c hange anything and was socially accepted. Is dominant because has a key role in the project. SOHEC Although it has the power to demand certain characteristics and has legitimacy in the project it doesnt concord big urgency since it isnt a client but a clients influencer.Good to keep informed. Working staff (remaining stakeholders) They dont guide swell power but they are dependent on milestones so also they have the urgency to meet expectations. They also have their legitimateness since they depend on each other and need to coordinate their designed areas. Hall, Todd and Littlemore, the three architects that replaced Utzon dont have any power since everything was plotted and they precisely needed to re-design the detonator in a way that could conform to the foundations.Public/Customers Since they are watching learns and over costs being paid from their taxes they are on the legitimate attribute because they are on the socially accepted and expected behaviours side (Mitchel l 1997). Media Has the indirect power of showing a project as a project triumph or failure. Meets the parameters of the legitimate attribute expecting behaviours and has the urgency of being time sensitive (generating news with the project delay). The main stakeholder was the architect, but Utzon was much more pertain with the design aspect earlier than time andcosts objectives, which proved problematic.During the project, Utzon collaborated with Ove Arup, who was in charge of the structure and the engineering while subcontractors were in charge of mechanics, electrics, heating and ventilating, lighting and acoustics. There was no real project manager, but rather collaboration between Utzon and Arup. The other main stakeholder was the client, the state of New South Wales (Australian government). A executive citizens committee was created to provide project supervision but the members had no real skillful skills.The government eventually became an obstacle to the project polic e squad by inhibiting changes during the proficiency of the operationsand thus contributed to cost overrun and delays. Finally, the public and media was an indirect stakeholder because they were concerned with the projects success. Defining INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS. External stakeholders The immaterial stakeholders can be considered as anyone outside the implementing organisations who could be affected by the projects results.Internal Stakeholders Internal stakeholders are those associated with the process, typically members of the project team or the face structure. After describing what infixed and external stakeholders are, it can be undertake what stakeholders need more attention, or in other words, need to be more satisfied. It is known that its impossible to keep all the stakeholders happy at the same time so the following plan will show that it was essential to keep NSW government and Mr.David Hughes happy (a monitor to say that the relationship between Utzon and David Hughes wasnt good). The relationship with Arup should be stronger in dress to have a let on sufficeance linking departments. As a result (of not doing it) the crown couldnt haul the foundations created by Arup (the crown was besides heavy for the foundations material) and the amount of resources would not be so many times recalculated, it would have minimized the time exhausted and the money eatd. The relation with the media should also be managed better.The relationship between stakeholders was too transparent and what was meant to be a huge partner advertising the project ended up pulling down the project in harm of future customers argue of view (customers would be operate by the media and associate the Sydney Opera House negatively). Also the relationship with the SOHEC could be better driven since it was the major beneficiated within the project. They did not pay for it (the government did) and they were represented by the ones that would use it the most but what was hope was glum into despair. POWER Keep Satisfied Manage Closely SOHEC NSW Government Arup David Hughes Media monitor Only Keep Informed Design Team Consultants Engineer Team Suppliers Contractor INTEREST Causes for project failure A project is a set of people and other resources temporarily assembled to reach a specified objective, normally with a fixed budget and with a fixed time period. sends are generally associated with products or procedures that are being done for the front time or with known procedures that are being altered (Graham 1985).Sidney Opera house was meant to be the perfect construction that allied Utzons angiotensin-converting enzyme and Arups structural expertise (Murray, P. 2004) but it is necessary to accept the fact that neither of them were a project manager, that just in the 70s started to be another person rather than being an engineer or an architect (the project manager), so Utzons management skills were based on experience and knowledge in his sector rather than in project management itself (lack of planning and management skills), which changes positions.While Utzon had a masterpiece perspective, Arup had a labor movement perspective. If they were project managers they would be more oriented to fulfil the stakeholders perspectives and the disdain by project perspective where they would focus on project investments and bene? ts, which include project results, project success, strategy, pro? t and bene? ts (Bjorn Johs. Kolltvei, 2005). Another main point is the fact of the allowance for the project changes at any time. The Sydney Opera house was supposed to have 2 rooms but ended up having 4 rooms.So it can show some discrepancy between what was wanted (before and after the new government) and what was delivered . In this project particularly the Government has changed so it is hard to say that is someones fault but in fact it had an impact, always asking for changes and putting pressure in Utzon. This shows that the agreements between Utzon and the previous Australian Government did not have strong levels of engament with the internal stakeholders (government, Minister, SOHEC).According to the OGC the UK Office of Government Commerce, it is essential to have assoil organisational boundaries and clear governance arrangements to ensure sustainability and it did not go throughed in this project, where the pressure was horrendous on Utzon to be use as the responsible for this huge cost and time overrun (and he has his fault because of the massive fail when designing a roof not sustained by its foundations and lack of cooperation with the Arup resulting on a bad choice of the materials for the roof) but Utzon cant be blamed by the recurrent changes asked on the entrances (still eing re-arran ged) and the halls, which had really poor acoustic feature. The Sydney Opera House was meant to be one of the six best opera houses in the earthwith a fine concert hall with perfect acoustics (Murray, P. 2004) But at the same time mother fucker Murray also states that (opera) however, was a minor interest. There were some local groups and the occasional tour from an Italian company but it was it.This shows that a major stakeholder the public was not taken into consideration since the tie was more international than national, but even there it failed(need to bear in mind that nowadays SOH is more profitable with huge concerts and museum and tenderness because it was re-oriented for more than Opera concerts) . The (new concept) of the halls were against the musical competition rules (being put side by side) and the acoustic were really poor, so even thou the objectives were delivered they didnt call properly about its benefits.Nowadays the Sydney Opera House had its changes es pecially in the access areas, parking and acoustics and now is used for the purpose of concerts and as a museum (tourist attraction). Lack of skills and proven approach to Project management and risk management As it is said, Project management was only developed in the 70s and 80s so the experience took place over the project management science (not really developed during the 50s) so it unquestionably lacked during the process. Error Margins completely malign, years and millions more were used and that is the biggest signal of a Project that has failed, when its error margins do not apply.Fortunately the SOH was re-used in order to have Return on Investment but not delivering a project oriented to its benefits is definitely a signal of project failure. The railyard of the project did not meet expectations, but those 14 years could have been less. Again the roof was the biggest problem. This has to be related with the lack of processes in place to ensure that all parties have a clear hearing of their roles and responsibilities, and a shared cause of desired outcomes, key terms and deadlines( Office of Government Commerce, CP0015/01/05).Furthermore the integration of such a big egress chain and still Utzon couldnt estimate the right amount of the right material for its foundations and roof (10%, 20% more resources on the overall budget is what it should be as part of the total budget and those 20% extra would be used for any emergency) shows no cooking stove and interaction with other participants (stakeholders). The entire sassy cited before shows lack of understanding. Utzon designed a roof that couldnt match with Arups foundations. Too many tiers, which goes against the prioritisation that is essential in a come forth chain.So it crossed over three main causes for a project failure Cost escalation, time escalation (error margins) and disturbance of the core processes (politics). Unrealistic timescale and Cost escalation? In the case of the Sydney O pera House incomplete plans, drawings and a lack of tuition about the material and the structure of its now-famous roof all added dramatically to the cost. The estimators (consultants, accountants, auditors) didnt shake off those errors other members of the project team did (Utzon, Arup).When the construction started there was no clearconcept of how the roof might be constructed. Its not that the estimates were wrong its that there was nothing to base the estimates on in the first place. Much of the delay and cost overrun was caused by iteration on roof design and lack of Data, eventually landing on a solution that constructed the roof out of interlocking tiles, but this solution was only discovered after a lot of time and childbed. PM effort is coordinated to reach a particular goal or perform some speci? c function. The ? eld demonstrates. . . means-end paradigm with a strong focus on discipline, goal anticipateing and end-item accomplishment (Pollack, J. 2006) this is why U tzon was a great architect and a bad project manager, because in this particular project he look out oned all these premises. Because of the time (the 50s) some major knowledge cant be used because it is unknown but it can be identified as lack of agile project management, a major failure to engage stakeholders, inappropriate leadership musical mode (Utzon resigned before the project was completed), insufficient procedures (as it was said before relating cost and time escalation).Recommendations Field tells us that projects fail too often because the project scope was not fully appreciated and/or user needs not fully understood. The meaning of a project can be materialized in the Sidney Opera House, but although it was a project, it failed by several reasons. RISK guidance The . . . traditional thinking behind a project risk management (PRM) framework is essentially centrist, authoritarian. It . . . assumes that the central project manager knows best (Williams 40, p. 219).Willia ms suggests that in Project Management participation and empowerment may actually emergence risk by reducing centralised control. Without an agreement that could make Utzon arrive on the project agreed before his risk management couldnt fit in new perspectives from the client like more rooms (halls). Demanding more and asking to reduce time due to the existent delay that was not expected in Utzons margins based on the projects milestones it shows that the pressure pretending to take power from Utzon (led to his resignation) helped to make of this project a failure.So, Risk Management would be one of the main focuses if I was the Project Manager. Achieving milestones, regular monitoring, evaluating and updating risk management plans and risk registers and confirm risk management processes for the duration of the project. FORECASTING DEALING WITH EXTERNAL MOTIVES Essentially, projects are like organisations. They have project governance, internal management systems, a number of st aff, external stakeholders, an external environment and goals, objectives and deliverables.However, project delivery in the construction industry comes with a higher degree of uncertainty due to industrial factors, complexity and changing technologies and uniqueness of projects where time, cost and quality need to be managed, sometimes equally, sometimes differently. Time Quality Cost In this particular case I would set up a standard of quality and add 20% margin error on the budget for resources. With a focus on quality I would make sure that the project would stick on the agreed and every change emanded would have a new budget and time escalation so the Government would think double before demanding. With a focus on quality and the cost already decided (with 20% for resources) the two main problems would be solved (the roof problem and the 50 million (AUS) dollars of cost overrun). Furthermore the time problem would be solved with an exact check point on milestones any delay would be due to external motives like a equatorial catastrophe or any alteration decided by the government but they would know in advance the cost and time waste of their decisions straight away instead of just demand alterations.STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT strategical approach Stakeholder Engagement is designed to take account of all the individuals and groups wedged by the proposed change and achieve a deeper understanding of their various interests. So, as a project manager I would make sure that the 6 principles below would be the foundations of my relation with the stakeholders. Significance deal with issues of significance to stakeholders and the agency. Completeness understand the concerns, views, needs and expectations.Responsiveness respond coherently and appropriately Communication open and efficient Transparency clear and agreed information and feedback processes. Collaboration work to seek mutually beneficial outcomes where feasible. Inclusiveness recognise, understand and invo lve stakeholders in the process. Integrity rent engagement in a manner that fosters mutual respect and trust. (Australian enchiridion for citizenship, Stakeholder Engagement Section, Strategic Policy Group, Implementation and Stakeholder Engagement Branch, 2008).Identifying the projects stakeholders, assessing them, and determining how they should be managed is a part of that process. When engaging stakeholder it is needed to identify, prioritise, understand and plan communication theory with stakeholders. When engaging stakeholder it is needed to identify, prioritise, understand and plan communications with stakeholders. The first and second points are already done with the stakeholder identification and classification above and also the Interest/Power grid designed before. As a reminder, pushcart states that, 2003, p. 261).Apart from the stakeholder groups identifiable by their more obvious tie-up with projects there are clear and major groups that are invisible but whose coop eration and support is vital for project success(2003, p. 261) so I would manage my tiers (in supply chain for materials) having three (tiers) for different specific materials instead of dealing with hundreds. taste stakeholders would be another important thing to start from. Apart from forecast I believe that is one of the best concepts that have to be collective in a project manager preparation to start a project.Asking himself what, who, when is really important and the understanding of the projects deliverables leads to a better understanding of stakeholders needs. That leads to a better collaboration between manager and stakeholders. Mitchell states that making collaboration between influential stakeholders and the project manager happen depends on personal behaviour changes by knowledge workers to not only work collaboratively but also to share knowledge. (Mitchell 2002, p. 59). Understanding Stakeholders leads to good communications.Following its key concerns and follow th e Power/Interest grid leads to a good understanding between stakeholders and project manager so all the four step has to be co-related. Conclusion Sydney Opera House is considered a project failure, weakness on the time scale and cost overrun and the quality of it is still being refurbished but it is an international attraction and no tourist wants to miss it when they go to Sydney. Utzon delivered his masterpiece but in a project managers point of view he had his limitations.Bad forecasting, bad planning skills and lack of stakeholder engagement were the main reasons for this project failure and I would have cogitate on milestones, identifying stakeholders, prioritising necessities and having a clear cost/time perspective and also having a clear risk assessment. References Mitchell, K. (2002), Collaboration and information sharing an ROI perspective? , The Public Manager, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 59-62 Lock, D. , Project Management, 5th edn. Gower, 1992. Nicholas, J. M. , Management o f patronage and Engineering Projects. Prentice Hall, 1990.J. K Pinto, J. E Prescot, Variations in critical success factors over the stages in the project life cycle Journal of Management, 14 (1) (1988), pp. 518 Kerzner H. , In search of excellence in project management. Journal of Systems Management, 1987, 3039 David I. Cleland, Lewis R. Ireland (2006). Project Management Strategic Design And Implementation. 5th edn. McGraw-Hill Professional. pp. 17-35. A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT OUR EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF PROJECT SUCCESS Kam Jugdev Ralf Muller Project Management Journal Dec 2005 36, 4 ABI/INFORM Global pg. 19 J.N Wright, Time and budget the twin imperatives of a project sponsor. International Journal of Project Management, 15 3 (1997), pp. 181186 Peter Murray (2004). The Saga Of Sydney Opera House The Dramatic Story Of The Design And Construction Of The delineation Of Modern Australia. Bedford Park Taylor Francis. p3-18. Bjorn Johs. Kolltveit et al. , Perspectives on project man agement, International Journal of Project Management (2006), doi10. 1016/j. ijproman. 2005. 12. 002 Julien Pollack, The changing paradigms of project management, International Journal of Project Management (2006), doi10. 016/j. ijproman. 2006. 08. 002 Williams T. Assessing and moving on from the dominant project management discourse in the light of project overruns. IEEE Trans Eng Manage 200552(4)497 Office of Government Commerce, CP0015/01/05, 2004 Field, Tom. (1997). When bad things happen to good projects, CIO magazine, Oct 15, 1997, Vol. 11, 2 pg. 54, 6 pgs. Lynda Bourne and Derek H. T. Walker Visualising and mapping stakeholder influence RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia (2003) Project Management Lectures from workweek 2 (1st semester) to week 7 (as of 2nd semester)
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